Abstract: Influenza vaccines are vital to nation's health, but their manufacturers are subject to random yield and market demand is assumed to be uncertain. To preferably balance the supply and demand, this paper analytically addresses the contract coordination of influenza vaccines supply chain (SC) under dual uncertainties. Comprehensively considering the seasonal characteristics and social attribute of influenza vaccines at their own expense, a SC decision model was designed aimed at the maximization of expected revenue, on the basis of vaccine destruction and negative external social costs. Based on the optimal planned output and revenue of the investigated SC under centralized decision-making model, this paper indicated that the wholesale price contract under decentralized decision-making model could not coordinate the investigated SC, and proposed a hybrid risk sharing contract, not only to coordinate the influenza vaccines SC under dual uncertainties, but also to make expected profit of the SC actors to achieve Pareto improvement. A numerical example was presented to illustrate the rationality of the contract.