Abstract: Recently, research on the security of the SILC focuses on known plaintext attack and chosen plaintext attack. There is a lack of research on ciphertext-only attack that the attackers carry the weakest capability. Statistical ineffective fault attack (SIFA) is a ciphertext-only attacking method of injecting faults against the implementation of ciphers. It can recover the secret key even when the cryptographic device outputs correct results only. This paper studies the security of SILC against SIFA. The theoretical analysis and experimental results show that the SILC lightweight authenticated encryption cannot resist SIFA. The proposed novel double distinguishers of KLD-HW and BD-MLE can recover the secret key of SILC with only 432 and 440 ineffective faults, respectively. Compared with classical distinguishers, the novel distinguishers not only reduce the number of faults, latency and complexity by 55.00%, 53.75%, and 58.30%, respectively, but also improve reliability and accuracy. These results provide a valuable insight for the secure of design and implementation of lightweight AEADs.